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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College. 
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TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS 
A Lecture delivered by 
Major General W. R, Wolfinbarger, U. S. A. F. 
at the Naval War College 
10 October 1950 
Admiral Cooley, members of the Staff, and students of 
the Naval War College: 
It is an honor and a privilege to be permitted to address 
you today on a subject which is related to one of the three major 
missions of the United States Air Force. Our Chief of Staff, 
General Vandenburg, has made the following statement before the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in 
Washington: 
"In the light of world conditions, in case of aggression 
against the United States, the major tasks to be undertaken by 
the Air Force in the defense of our country are clear: 
First: The delivery of an immediate and powerful strategic air 
offensive against the basic sources of our enemy's war 
making capacity. 
Second: The defense of the United States and.our essential bases 
against attack by air. 
Third: Tactical support of the Army and Navy in exploitation 
of the opportunity presented through successful prose­
cution of the first two. tasks." 
This last mission is obviously an extremely important one 
�nd is one to which the Air Force is devoting an increasing amount 
General Wolfinbarger is the Commanding General ,of the Ninth 
Tactical Air Force at Pope Air Force Base, Fort Bragg, N. C. 
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of attention. Strategic Bombing arid Air Defense may catch the 
public fancy and warrant the bulk of the newspaper publicity, but 
this in no way indicates that the problems of Tactical Air Sup­
port are being neglected. 
In treating this subject of Tactical Air Support I shall en­
deavor to confine my remarks to those aspects of the Tactical 
Air problem which are appropriate to you gentlemen who are at 
this school preparing yourselves for staff positions in higher head­
quarters and as senior commanders. 
My objective during this lecture is to tell you as much as 
I can, in the short time available, regarding the problem of as­
suring that the surface forces receive the best possible assistance 
from the Air Force during combat operations. 
I shall discuss principles involved, the methods of achieving 
the necessary coordination between the surface forces and the air 
forces, the capabilities and limitations of Tactical Air Power which 
I believe must be recognized by key staff officers and commanders, 
and finally, some of the trends in this type of operation that may be 
affected by new development of weapons. 
The measure of success we will achieve, when and if this 
type of operation becomes necessary, - will depend directly upon 
the proper definition and application of these principles, the de­
gree of coordination achieved and a sound knowledge of the optimum 
usage of the air weapons to be employed. 
Before proceeding to the main points of discussion, I shall 
limit and define the subject a bit more: 
I shall here discuss primarily those elements of tactical 
air power which are mainly engaged in making offensive strikes 
2 RESTRICTED 
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against enemy targets, and thereby of cou:i::oSe assist the surfac<;l
forces in the accomplishment of. their mission.
There are however other functions of tactical air which 
will not be dealt with in detail during this hour, but which are 
equally important; and it is vital that you bear these functions in 
mind whenever you are thinking in terms of Tactical Air Sup­
port or are engaged in discussions on the subject. Tactical Air 
Support includes: maintaining air superiority in the area of op­
erations; Air Defense of vital installations in our assigned area 
of responsibility; tactical reconnaissance, which includes weather, 
visual and day and night photographic reconnaissance; troop 
carrying of airborne units and their equipment; air resupply ac­
tivities and evacuation of casualties; and air courier and mes­
senger service. These functions, which are absolutely vital to 
the success of the surface forces, are usually completely ignored 
by the arm chair experts, and the people who think that when 
they have mastered the technique of furnishing close support to 
a front line battalion or regiment, that they have learned all 
there is to know about Tactical Air. In drawing conclusions on 
this subject, always remember that the functions of a Tactical 
Air Force include many responsibilities in addition to the re­
quirement for close support of the ground force. 
Before becoming involved in the details of doctrine and em­
ployment of air support, it might be well to take a quick glance at 
the over-all concept pertaining to operations in this field. In other 
words, we should consider the conditions under which this air­
ground or Air-Navy-Army team might operate in future war. 
As an example, there are many who believe that it will 
never again be necessary to launch a full scale amphibious invasion 
with land, sea and air forces assaulting the enemy on a hostile 
shore. Others profess to believe that such operations will be im-
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possible in the future. Others say that practically all previous 
concepts have been swept away by the atomic age. I am sure we 
all realize that past wars will never be re-fought and that circum­
stances and weapons are constantly changing. However, be that as 
it may, we believe that as long as our military establishment con­
sists of three major components, land, sea and air, it is reasonable 
to assume, that in the event of war in the immediate future, major 
participation of all three services will be required. Furthermore, in 
any mission which will require a two or three-service task force, 
it is conceived that the tasks of supporting air would, in general, 
be the same as they were at the end of World War II. 
These then are the offensive tasks: we must have the 
capability of air combat to maintain the necessary degree of air 
! superiority in the area of operations; we must have the capability
of striking targets whose destruction will prevent hostile supplies
and reserves from reaching the area of action of our ground or
sea forces; and we must have the capability of striking targets
which are actually resisting the advance of our supported force.
The means of achieving proper allocation of the tactical air 
effort and of securing the necessary coordination between the serv­
ices, as developed during the last war, were reasonably successful. 
Thus it would appear that the broad principles which governed the 
employment of tactical air support at the end of World War II are 
still valid for the immediate future. 
Newer and better weapons are being developed, aircraft 
speeds are increasing, and tactics and techniques must be progress­
ively modified at fairly frequent intervals. Sound principles how­
ever are only seldom outmoded. 
There are five fundamental principles covering the Tactical 
4 RESTRICTED 
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employment of Air Power which I believe are still valid and which
deserve further comment here. These are: 
1. There must be centralized control of tactical Air Units which
are supporting surf ace forces.
2. The effort of the Tactical Air Force and the surface forces
must be integrated.
3. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority in the combat
area and in areas of projected operations of the surface
forces is vital in order to assure success of a major ground
or amphibious campaign.
4. Interdiction of the battle area is the most profitable manner
in which to employ offensive tactical air units against
ground and naval targets in the support of armies and am­
phibious forces.
5. In accordance with the coordinated plan of operation, striking
elements of the Tactical Air Forces must attack and destroy
ground or naval targets in the immediate battle area.
The first two of these principles, which I have set forth, deal
with organization, and the relationship between the operating Army, 
Navy and Air Force Headquarters. The other three principles bear 
directly on employment or the manner in which the tactical air 
striking units are utilized. All five together comprise the basis upon 
which sound employment of tactical air power is :founded. 
Having taken a brief glance at the items set forth on the 
chart, let us examine each one a bit more in detail. 
First is the matter of centralized control. Centralized control 
is, of course, a basic military principle for the conduct of all military 
RESTRICTED 5 
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operations. This does not mean that one man controls the detailed 
activities of every individual in a Tactical Air Force. It does mean, 
however, that the organization and command structure must exist so 
that, at any given moment, the air commander at any echelon of com­
mand may take advantage of the inherent flexibility and mobility of 
the air arm in order to divert air strikes to critical targets. He must 
be able to concentrate the air power at his disposal on objectives 
which require the application of the principle of mass. Through cen­
tralized control, the preponderance-or even all-of the air effort 
may be rapidly shifted in accordance with the changing require­
ments of a fast moving tactical situation. 
The second principle, dealing with integration of effort, also 
affects the command and staff organization of the air and army 
headquarters or the components of a joint force, and the relation­
ship of the commanders at various echelons. You will notice that I 
have said that the effort is integrated and not that the forces are 
integrated. The forces must form a team the higher commanders 
of which coordinate their efforts in order to attain a common ob­
jective which is the rapid and effective defeat of the hostile force. T'o 
achieve maximum effectiveness, each component of these coordinat­
ed forces must operate under its own commander. The scheme of 
employment of the air-surface team must be a coordinated action 
from the inception of the planning for the operation to its com­
pletion. I will discuss later how this coordination is effected. 
The next three principles of sound employment of tactical 
air power bear directly on the manner in which the air striking 
units are utilized. Number three is that the gaining, and maintain­
ing, of general air superiority, or air superiority in the area of 
combat and the areas of projected operations of the surface forces, 
is vital in order to assure success of any major ground or amphibious 
campaign. I do not believe that it will be necessary to develop this 
portion of the doctrine any further before this audience. Many of 
6 RESTRICTED 
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you personally served in units which were 0helping to develop and 
prove the validity of this principle early in World War IL Through­
out the war this principle was never questioned. Each successive 
campaign, in every theater, reaffirmed its validity. 
The fourth basic principle, which we use as a guide in con­
ducting offensive air support operations, may be stated as follows: 
The interdiction of the battle area is the most profitable manner in 
which to use offensive tactical air units against ground and naval 
targets in the support of armies and amphibious forces. It is 
axiomatic that the severance of the enemy's lines of communication 
compromises his ability to sustain, supply, deploy and reinforce his 
forces. An enemy with this reduced capacity is certainly a less 
formidable foe to oppose our supported units. Furthermore, enemy 
men or equipment, destroyed before gaining contact with our own 
forces, show the greatest net profit when balanced against the cost 
of our offensive operations. 
In conducting these attacks on lines of communication, and 
here we are using the term in its broadest sense, the inherent 
characteristics of the airplane permit the crew to seek out, if need 
be, and successfully attack directly, troop concentrations, supply 
points, railroad movements, troop and supply ships, harbors, 
docks, headquarters and other facilities. 
Troops in bivouac or on the move are always more vulnerable 
than when deployed in combat. Supplies being moved on land or 
on the sea, or assembled at storage or supply depots, are more con­
centrated than when broken down for distribution or issue. Vulner­
able points, such as bridges, viaducts, choke points, harbors and 
docks, are easily identified from the air either visually or by elec­
tronic devices. These factors result in a greater percentage of air­
craft finding and advantageously attacking interdiction targets than 
can be expected against deployed or dispersed targets. 
RESTRICTED 7 
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The fifth and last basic principle dictates that, in accordance 
with the coordinated plan of operation, the striking elements of 
the tactical air force attack hostile ground or naval targets in the 
immediate battle area. Since this type of attack is in close prox­
imity to our friendly forces, the tactical air force must exercise 
close direction and control, and the maximum of coordination with 
other friendly forces must be achieved. 
Targets deployed in the battle area are usually not con­
centrated and are therefore less vulnerable than targets in the 
interdiction area. Troops are invariably dug-in, ground targets are 
protected by the maximum of camouflage and concealment. Con­
sequently, these targets are more difficult to pick up and identify 
from the air. The probability is less that a given bomb, bullet or 
rocket will do as much damage here as the same missile would if 
fired on an interdiction target. 
It goes without saying, that air crews must be carefully 
trained in identification procedures. Control personnel on the 
ground, and Army and Navy combat personnel, must likewise be 
carefully schooled in marking, identification, and follow-up pro­
cedures., Both Air Force and surface force commanders must never 
be permitted to forget the importance of. the coordinated attack. 
Battle experience has amply demonstrated that the greatest benefits 
are gained if air attacks are immediately followed by assaulting 
troops. The most remunerative air support targets on the bat­
tlefield are those which are moving in a counter-attack, a shift in 
deployment, or in a withdrawal. 
We could sum up the principles I have discussed in one 
sentence as follows: An air commander who has centralized control 
of offensive tactical air power, and whose efforts have been inte­
grated with those of the ground or amphibious force commander, 
may, as the situation dictates, allocate or direct the mass of his of-
8 RESTRICTED 
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fensive resources to counter air opera,tions, interdiction targets, 
and/or direct participation in the surface battle area. 
I have discoursed at some length about principles and I must 
follow this up by reminding you that while principles are extremely 
important, they are still only principles, and they have been created 
to serve, and not to function as masters. It is sometimes easy to 
become a slave of operating doctrine and principle, and every prin­
ciple must be re-examined each time it is employed. 
The highest degree of coordination between Air Forces and 
Ground or Naval Forces in a theater or area of operations can only 
be achieved through the establishment of a sound command relation­
ship between the appropriate forces, and by the exercise of close 
joint planning. 
First let us consider organization. Normally, there will be a 
theater or task force commander whose command will be either 
unified or combined in n,ature. In this paper I will consider only 
the unified command which is composed only of the armed services 
of one country. In this case, the Theater Commanders staff is joint 
and is composed of appropriate representation from each of the 
three services. The forces within the theater are composed of 
Army, Navy, and Air Force components. If the operations in the 
Theater are of sufficient magnitude, the air component may consist 
of a Strategic Air Command, a Tactical Air Command, and appro­
priate supporting air cQmmands. However, I believe that normally 
the strategic air forces would not be allocated to theater command­
ers, but would be retained under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Therefore in a normal situation it is entirely possible that all the 
combat Air Forces operating under the Air Component commander 
might be in one or more Tactical Air Commands. The subordinate 
commands of the Air Force components of the theater forces would 
then be The Tactical Air Command and appropriate supporting com-
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mands. And, in fact, the Tactical Air Command might be designated 
as the Air Force component of the Theater Forces. 
The Tactical Air Command would be composed of an appro­
priate number of Tactical Air Forces, the Tactical Bomber Force, a 
Troop Carrier Force if required, a Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 
and necessary service units .. The corresponding levels of command 
between the Air Force and the Army are: THE ARMY GROUP­
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND and THE FIELD ARM-TACTICAL 
AIR FORCE. 
The Theater Commander allocates the force to be employed in 
the air-ground campaign to the Army Group and the Tactical Air 
Command, if necessary, through the respective theater component 
commanders. The Theater Commander establishes overall direc­
tives and priorities of operations for the guidance of the Army and 
Tactical Air Commanders. The Tactical Air Command is organized 
to support an Army Group and has assigned to it an appropriate 
number of Tactical Air Forces each of which is organized to sup­
port a Field Army. This type of organization of theater forces 
provides for parallel levels of command which work together to 
achieve the lateral coordination necessary for .the successful ac­
complishment of the common. mission. 
In an area which may be remote from a theater, or for 
special tasks which may include the employment of Army, Navy 
and Air Forces, Joint Task Forces may be organized. The com­
ponents of a Joint Task Force may consist of appropriate table 
of organization units such as the Field Army and a Tactical Air 
Force or component task force. Either arrangement permits the 
same lateral coordination between headquarters that exists in 
the theater organization. 
10 RESTRICTED 
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This leads us to a discussion,. of command relationships 
between the forces. 
In the examples which I have given, you will always find 
in every operation area, a common superior commander placed
above the two or three military component commanders. This 
common commander issues a single directive to the air, naval, 
and/or ground component commanders who are then jointly re­
sponsible for the proper integration of their respective efforts 
to insure that the coordinated action achieved is in the further­
ance of the common objective. Here then, parallel levels of com­
mand cooperate in planning and executing their operations. Yet 
the integrity of the chain of command in each component is 
preserved. 
In air-ground operations, joint planning and command de­
cisions are normally limited to the ARMY GROUP-TACTICAL 
AIR COMMAND and the FIELD ARMY-TACTICAL AIR 
FORCE, levels. Should there be a difference of opinion between 
any two commanders, the matter is referred to the next higher 
echelon of the air ground commands. For those matters which can­
not be jointly resolved, the Theater or Joint Task Force Com­
mander is the final and positive authority. 
And now, I wish to comment on planning, which I con­
sider one, or perhaps even the most important element necessary 
for the successful accomplishment of Air Support. For any co­
ordinated effort, it is vital that planning be conducted on a joint 
basis, from the beginning. ,It must be carried through on a joint 
basis and be properly and jointly blended into the operational 
·phase.
In the air-ground operations, · joirit planning is carried on 
at parallellevels of command down to, and including the ARMY-
RESTRICTED 11 
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TACTICAL AIR FORCE level which is the lowest echelon which 
plans and conducts independent operations. 
At each level the corresponding headquarters are always 
located as close to each other as is practicable and at the FIELD 
ARMY-TACTICAL AIR FORCE level it is axiomatic that the 
headquarters be located literally side by side. The Air and Ground 
Commanders and their corresponding staff personnel are then 
readily able to exchange information, formulate plans, and discuss 
problems of joint interest. Even perfect communications, between 
widely separated headquarters, cannot substitute for the frequent 
personal contact between commanders and staffs in closely ad­
jacent headquarters. 
Joint planning should begin with the inception of the idea 
for the operation. The first phases are accomplished jointly in 
the theater headquarters and result in a broad but sound directive 
to the commanders involved. Based on this directive, each lower 
echelon of command develops its plan to include all information, and 
the decisions, necessary to permit the subordinate Air and Ground 
Commanders to accomplish their respective tasks. The evaluation 
of the Air-Ground plan is based upon the principle of mutual accord 
between Air and Ground Commanders. Differences of opinion are 
effectively brought into the open and mutually resolved, and ex­
perience has shown that it is a rare case indeed which must be 
carried to the top command for final resolution. However, should 
this be necessary the means of doing so exist, and in no case can 
there be a case of "no decision". At the lowest echelon, the selec­
tion of targets and the allocation of effort applied to air superior­
ity, interdiction and close support, depends on the concurrence of 
both the Air and the Ground Commander. 
Operational planning is mainly conducted at the FIELD 
ARMY-TACTICAL AIR FORCE level, however the plan for the 
12 RESTRICTED 
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nse of the Tactical Bomber support and its escort, and the
allocation of forces to the various Tactical Air Forces is conducted
at the TACTICAL AIR COMMAND-ARMY GROUP level. Con­
ferences provide the. most efficient method of planning Air­
Ground operations. These conferences usually consist of meetings, 
of the Air and Ground Commanders and selected members of their
staffs. Operations and Intelligence personnel are particularly im­
portant here. At these conferences both sides inform the other of 
their respective plans, capabilities and requirements. A typical 
agenda for such a joint conference would include a review of the 
current battle situation, a weather forecast, a summary of di­
rectives from higher authority, and a description of the current 
Army and Air Force plan of action. Based on a conference of this 
nature, detailed instructions are issued to the lower units. These 
instructions must include specific tasks for each air unit and de­
tailed instructions as to how coordination with specified Army 
units is to be achieved. 
I will now cover some of the capabilities and limitations of 
Tactical Air Power which high-level staff officers and commanders 
should recognize and bear in mind when planning or executing of­
fensive Air Support Operations. 
There are several types of factors which affect the degree 
of air support that we are able to deliver. There are those tech­
nical capabilities and limitations which are inherent in aircraft, 
such as, the built-in speed, range, and maneuverability of the air­
plane. It is unnecessary to discuss specific current airplane 
characteristics here, since aircraft characteristics are subject to 
continuous change. It is' necessary to mention, however, that 
when it comes to designing aircraft for ground support, all the 
characteristics must be carefully weighed against each other. 
Strategic factors must also be considered. These factors 
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will affect the amount of air support which will become available. 
The strategic concept, or the manner in which a war will be waged 
has a great effect on the number of Tactical Air Forces and Air, 
Support Combat units which will be included in the organization 
,of our country's Air Force. It will also effect the rate of mobilization 
and training of such un:fts as will be required: It affects the 
priorities for type aircraft which will be produced. 
Then finally we have the operational factors which affect the 
availability and effectiveness of air support. The principal op- ' 
erational factors are: the mission and method of operation of the 
supported unit, climate and weather, the terrain, and the number, 
size and condition of the available airfields and their distance from 
the front lines., All these factors have a great bearing on the ef­
ficiency of an air unit and consequently effect the final availability 
of air support to the surface force. 
Now I should like to discuss new developments in aircraft 
and electronics as pertain to tactical air requirements. Generally 
speaking, 'technical developments, which affect Tactical Air Opera­
tions, are progressing in a satisfactory and encouraging manner, 
and I will mention some of the more important developments. 
Much consideration and study has been devoted to deter­
mining the advisability or inadvisability of developing special­
ized types of aircraft to perform specific tactical missions. No one 
airplane has yet been developed which will completely satisfy all
requirements. Different types of aircraft complicate logistics and 
training, are expensive, and reduce the air commander's capability 
in application of mass attacks. In short, flexibility is destroyed. 
However, there is one common denominator which we believe all air­
craft used in tactical air support operations must possess-that 
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In the field of. combat type aircraft, our future fighter­
bombers, through the use of more efficient and more powerful jet 
engines, and through improved aircraft design, will be capable of 
carrying heavier armament loads and will be capable of greater 
endurance. In this connection we must remember that the jet 
aircraft is only in the infancy of its development. In the Korean 
situation the jet aircraft has proved itself a formidable weapon. 
Combat experience has proved that the F-80 fighter will take more 
punishment from either air or ground fire than piston engine 
fighters. This contrasts with previous fears that the delicately 
balanced gas turbine engines might be more easily put out of 
action. Jet aircraft can now match piston engine planes in range 
and capacity to carry bombs, rockets and guns, while far exceeding 
them in speed and rate of climb. Jets are also easier to maintain. 
The pilots "feel better" in jets. They found that jets can take it 
better than conventional types, and they can get out of hot spots 
in a hurry or go upstairs and fight if attacked. On a broad 
basis, the Korean situation consolidated previous views-we· know 
we have to have a plane that can fight its way through enemy air 
opposition and also do ground support work. 
Beyond the fundamentals of jet fighter operations, the Air 
Force didn't learn a great deal in South Korea because the one jet 
type in service there was not especially designed for ground sup­
port work and there were so few enemy jets in the .air. 
Small units of other jet fighters and bombers, both de­
signed for ground support, are expected to see combat in North 
Korea. Undoubtedly the North Korean phase will see some changes 
in operations because of' the tremendous advantage of air bases 
near the battle line. The F-,;51. Mustang propeller fighter ex.; 
tensively employedin Korea could hot ha'7e been used if the North 
Koreans h�d employed a sizeable force ·of jets. 
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What about the future of the Air Force in view of Korean 
experience and the newly available funds for building up to the 
"70-Group" idea? 
Under the former limited funds program, the Air Force 
could not do all its planners felt should be done, so it concen­
trated on defense and strategic air problems that would have to 
be met first in a major war.i The Anny ground forces, under sim­
ilar money restraints, did not have enough divisions to justify 
more emphasis on tactical air strength than was given it. 
Now that is changed. There will be ground forces to sup­
port and funds for development and funds to build and train an 
Air Force for the job. New purchase orders will call for nearly 
doubling the ratio of air defense and ground support planes to 
medium and heavy bombers. 
Without going into detail I wish to mention three funda­
mental criteria of tactical aircraft to accomplish the tactical 
mission. They are: 
a. The ability to live in the air.
b. Provision for delivery of effective armament.
c. Possession of effective radius of action.
With these three basic requirements in mind, let us turn to an ex­
amination of the aircraft we now have in light of their capabilities 
and limitations. 
An example of a present-day tactical fighter aircraft is 
the F-84E. Its speed of over 600 mph is considered satisfactory 
for present day air-to-air operations. Climb to 30,000 feet in 10 
minutes is unsatisfactory for intercept purposes. Endurance of 
nearly 4 and ½ hours (only available when carrying 4 tanks) 
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appears to be good; however, these estimates are obtained at high
altitude with maximum fuel and air-to-air armament. The F-84E
airplane is committed to day operations, in that it is not equipped
with night and all-weather navigational, intercept or bombing 
systems. 
In the tactical bomber field we have the North American 
B-45 Tornado.. Its speed of well over 500 mph is acceptable today
for survival purposes during night and all-weather operations,
but marginal during daylight operations. This estimate is based
upon intercept probabilities. The gross weight of the B-45 is ex­
cessive for operation from hastily prepared airstrips but its radius
of action should eliminate the necessity for its use of such airstrips.
The take-off ground run distance of 3,700 feet at gross weight
condition is at sea level under standard day condition from hard
surface airstrips. Its bomb loads are considered satisfactory for
present· and foreseeable future requirements. The B-45 is the
only all-weather airplane presently available to tactical air units.
It is equipped with an electronic navigational and bombing sys­
tem.
The ground support aircraft to replace the F-84E will be 
the swept wing F-84F manufactured by the same firm-Repub­
lic. This aircraft is faster and has a better rate of climb than its 
predecessor. Its various radii of action as pronounced by the 
manufacture for the different armament loads are acceptable. It 
appears that the F-84F possesses the dual capabilities for both 
tactical air support and air interception. This aircraft will be 
ready for mass production in the near future. 
The aircraft which appears most capable of accomplishing 
the over-all tactical fighter mission is the air support version of 
the Lockheed F-94C. The aircraft was primarily designed for all­
weather interceptor operation but lends itself readily to modifica-
RESTRICTED 17 
21
War College: February 1951 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1951
.RESTRICTED 
tion for the air support mission and tactical reconnaissance. In 
general, the aircraft incorporates all the favorable features of 
the F-80 but has nearly twice the power, a strong thinner wing 
for higher speeds and loads, greater combat radius, and added 
provisions for carrying external ordnance loads. A . unique 
feature of this aircraft is its dual speed brakes, a combination of 
those used on the standard F-80 and F-86. It has, on occasion, 
descended from 40,000 feet, landed and parked on the ramp in 2½ 
minutes. In a sustained vertical dive these speed brakes hold the 
aircraft to a maximum of Mach. 7. Tactical Air Command has 
requested higher authority for the procurement of this aircraft 
which will be available in the near future. 
The need for an aircraft capable of delivering armament on 
selected targets under all-weather conditions and during hours of 
darkness dictates a requirement for the tactical bomber. The 
present bulk and weight of electronic bombing and navigational 
systems preclude the use of a fighter type for this mission. 
Furthermore, there are certain ta:i;gets and conditions where a 
heavy, concentrated weight of bombs is more effective than that 
capable of delivery by fighter-bomber attacks. 
At present the Martin B-51, North American AJ-1, and 
British Canberra are being evaluated. The B-51 is capable of re­
markable speed. The British Canberra is very fast and man­
euverable and possesses an exceptional combat radius under certain 
conditions. 
Today there is a tactical deficiency in adequate navigational 
and bombing systems. Fighter-bombers will be useless during dark­
ness and bad weather until a miniature navigational system is 
available and electronic air-to-ground ranging is perfected. Sys­
tems presently being developed fall into two categories: 
a. Those which employ ground stations (predetermination
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of target coordinates limited to static situations over well­
mapped territory) such a light weight Shoran; ground stations
and beacons.
b. Those which are completely airborne.
The perfection of completely airborne electronic bombing 
and navigational systems holds the greatest promise for all­
weather tactical air operations. What is required is an elec­
tronic replacement for the pilot's eyes so that close tactical sup­
port can be undertaken under any weather conditions. 
Another development is in ranging radar equipment for 
the A-1 gun sight. This can be used to determine range in at­
tacks on ground targets as well as air targets, resulting in in­
creased accuracy for strafing and rocketry attacks. This system, 
or similar development, will be a big step forward in providing 
the single-seat fighter with all-weather air-to-ground capabilities. 
At the present time our control system is equipped for 
the most part with mobilized versions of static radar equipment 
which were developed during the closing phases of the last war. 
The height finders and the medium range search radars had many 
deficiencies that have become increasingly more apparent as 
techniques and aircraft change. Some of the major deficiencies 
are: 
a. Lack of suitable range.
b. Easily jammed by Electronic Counter Measures ac­
tivities. 
c. Lack of flexibility ( each function of the control system
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Planned improvements are: 
a. The modification of the height finder equipment to
increase its range. 
b. Medium range search radars are to be modernized by
the addition of a Moving Target Indicator kit. This modifica;.. 
tion will eliminate ground clutter from the scopes and will permit 
only actual air targets to be shown. The next step for this piece of 
equipment will be to replace it with a completely mobile version 
for air warning and control of tactical air operations. 
The communications equipment now used for the trans­
mission of air-to-ground and air-to-air intelligence is becoming 
obsolescent because of its slowness and vulnerability to Electronic 
Counter Measures. 
Our aim is to obtain an integrated control and communication 
system sufficiently light-weight, mobile and capable of fulfilling 
the requirements. These are: 
a. Detection of airborne and surface objects (without beacon).
b. Identification of detected objects.
c. Location of detected objects.
d. Control of friendly aircraft and missiles.
e. Continuous air-to-ground, air-to'-air and ground-to-air
communications. 
Until the beginning of August the standard rocket arma­
ment was the 5" HVAR. This rocket was only effective when 
hits were registered on the tracks or the rear of the tank. They 
were ineffective against the heavy armor on the front and only 
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moderately effective on the turret. However, a 6½,., ATAR 
rocket, with a "shaped charge" warhead on a 5" motor has been 
tried with great success. These will penetrate 16" of armor 
steel. (Joseph Stalin Mark III carries 11" of armor plate.) In­
cidentally, napalm, when dropped from altitudes below 100 feet, 
has proved to be most effective against tanks and troop concen­
trations. 
A new but very interesting development just getting un­
derway is the convertiplane., A convertiplane may be defined as 
a vertical rising aircraft having. conventional aircraft forward 
speed capabilities. The second phase of this program will be to 
build a light cargo convertiplane. 
In the field of airborne-troop carrier operations the U. S. 
Air Force has under development three (3) types of aircraft that 
are expected to add versatility to this type of operation. · We have 
under development, and now flying, the C-124 which has been 
called a global troop carrier aircraft. It is capable of carrying a 
fifty thousand pound pay-load or two hundred personnel. This air­
craft is designed for the rapid loading and unloading of all types 
of heavy military equipment with the exception of our largest 
tanks. 
We have under development several assault type trans­
ports. These aircraft are designed to land troops and especially 
heavy military equipment into small unprepared airfields. As­
sault type transports in general are designed to carry out the 
functions performed by gliders during the past war in a more rapid 
and efficient manner. 
Many aircraft manufacturers are presently making engineer-
ing design studies to determine the feasibility of development of 
pod carrier aircraft. These design studies apply to both convention­
al aircraft and to the helicopter. The purpose of this type air­
craft is the rapid re-supply of an airhead or other activity by air-
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craft capable of lifting a pre-loaded pod or carrier unit from a 
rear base into a forward base. As a matter of fact, Hughes Air­
craft Company is now ground testing their XH-17 Flying Crane, 
which is a helicopter powered with two J-35 engines, which are 
normally rated at 5,000 pound thrust, driving a 136 foot rotor. 
This aircraft is designed to meet an Army need for short haul of 
heavy equipment such as tanks or artillery across terrain hither­
to impassible. 
All these developments clearly indicate that much thought 
and energy is being devoted to the technical aspects of the de­
velopment of tactical air. There is no indication that the subject 
of Tactical Air Support is being allowed to stagnate in either the 
technical, tactical or theoretic fields. 
Now in closing, I wish to touch on one more subject, 
which is of great interest to me and which I am sure will in­
terest this audience. I refer, of course, to the tactical employment 
of Atomic Weapons. On this subject I can only apply a little de­
ductive reasoning. We are all aware that the stockpile of A-bombs 
is increasing rather than diminishing. As this stockpile of 
available weapons increases, more and more consideration is being 
given to diversified employment; that is, to uses in addition to the 
primary strategic use. I do not pretend to know what our present 
stockpile of these weapons is, but I do know that the problem of 
tactical employment of this weapon is receiving much serious at­
tention by many people whose business it is to consider these mat­
ters. I consider it self-evident atomic weapons will be an accepted 
part of tactical air operations in the near future and that they will 
have a profound effect on the conduct of both land and sea war­
fare. It may be that we will never have enough of these weapons 
to permit us to be prodigal in their use, but you may be assured 
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MAJOR LOGISTICS LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II 
A Lecture delivered by 
Lt. Comdr. Kent D. Algire, SC, USN 
at the Naval War College 
on 7 November 1950 
Time brings the truth to light. 
(Greek proverb) 
The subject of this paper is "Major Logistics Lessons of 
World War II," or-"Enough was Too Much." I think it would be 
better if we calied it "Some Major Logistics Lessons of World War 
II," because we can't go into all of them here, and therefore I have 
selected a few that I feel are among the most important. Actually, 
nearly everybody has his own ideas on a subject like this one. And 
that's perfectly natural-all I can do here is to give you a sort of 
kick-off, to give you some ideas which you can think about, dis­
card, or add to, in accordance with your own convictions. The main 
point is to get our thoughts focused on the logistic aspect of war. 
You know, if we take Webster's word for it that a lesson is some­
thing that is "learned," I sometimes wonder if we should talk 
about lessons at all. 
Now-looking at the title again, it is easy to see that in 
order to condense this sort of discussion into an article of this 
size we will have to put some artificial limitations on the area we 
cover. Now, as I see it, we should take the most important things 
first, and I would say that lessons on an international antl national 
scale would, generally speaking, be the most important. Next, we 
have the overall military problems, and then the individual mili­
tary departments. After that we have the theater problems and 
finally the operating forces themselves. Now, since we can't cover 
all these areas completely, I decided to do it something like this: 
Lt. Comdr. Algire is a member of the staff at the Naval War College. 
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This illustrates graphically the entire area of logistics ap­
plication, from international, at the top, to operating forces, at the 
bottom. Now, as I said, I feel we should cover the top three di­
visions as fully as we can-that is-the international, national, 
and over-all military. Then as we drop to the single service levels, 
and on down, I think it appropriate to concentrate on the naval as­
pects. Of course, at the theater level, because of the unified nature 
of the command, it is difficult to divorce one service from the others. 
In addition to considering the areas where we may find 
logistics lessons, let's stop for a minute and see what kind of 
logistic lessons we might uncover. Of course, I could just recite 
as many lessons as we have space for, but I think it will help in ap­
proaching the problem if we can group the lessons into general 
categories. Probably there are several such categories we could use,. 
but, to me, there were three that seemed the most logical. 
First, and possibly most important, lesson in PRINCIPLE.
Lessons · learned in principle would be reflected in 
ORGANIZATION. 
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Now, if we think of the areas of logistics application, and 
of the three broad categories into which logistic lessons might fall,
it may help us to understand a little better the significance of
these lessons. This is intended simply as a sort of an orientation 
aid, and I will not attempt to pin-point each lesson into an area 
or category. Actually, by their nature, these lessons must overlap 
each other. 
It has been said by many well qualified people that World 
War II was a war of logistics. It was characterized by the totality 
with which manpower and resources were mobilized and by the 
energy with which the two sides attempted to destroy each other's 
material resources for war. If we recall the bombing campaigns 
of both the Axis and the Allies, if we remember the desperate 
battle of the Atlantic sea lanes and the enormous magnitude of 
lend-lease shipments, we realize the part that materiel played 
in the world's greatest war. 
Now, as we know, all wars have not followed this pattern. 
Of course, every war has presented its own problems of equip­
ment and supply. But the crudeness of weapons and equipment, 
the relatively undeveloped industrial systems, and the slow and 
inefficient means of transportation for a long time restricted war­
fare to a relatively limited basis. As weapons have become more 
destructive, as industry has developed, and as transportation has 
become more rapid, the tempo and the extent of wars have risen 
until now it is common to speak in terms of total war. 
About this time of year a number of our students are 
wrestling with the comparison of war potentials. When you try to 
make such a comparison you become aware rather quickly of the 




Naval War College Review, Vol. 4 [1951], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol4/iss2/1
RESTRICTED 
This was recognized by our top man in the last war. and is 
illustrated by some of his own words. This is a quotation: 
"The war in Europe has reached the final decisive 
phase-the attack on Germany itself. But we have much 
longer and much farther to go in the war against Japan. 
"All these operations had to be planned far in advance 
-and that does not mean merely drawing arrows on maps.
It has meant planning in terms of precisely how many men
will be needed, and how many ships-warships, cargo
ships, landing craft-how many bombers and how many
fighter planes-and how much equipment and what types
of equipment down to the last cartridge. And it has meant
getting all of them to the right place at the right moment.
"It has meant establishing for our Army and Navy sup­
ply lines extending over 56,000 miles-more than twice 
the circumference of this earth." 
The man who spoke those words was the late Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, speaking in 1944. 
If there is any single logistic lesson that can be drawn from 
World War II, I think it must be this. 
NATIONAL LOGISTIC STRENGTH HAS A CONTROL­
LING IMPORTANCE AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN NATIONAL 
WAR POTENTIAL. 
I believe that in any major war between world powers, the 
victor must have substantial and sustained superiority in the qual­
ity and quantity of its weapons and supporting equipment. To have 
this superiority it must have, or have access to, a preponderance of 
national logistic strength-that is, the resources, the manpower, the 
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production facilities plus the transportation to direct this power
against the enemy.
You know, in contests of any kind, we usually learn most of 
the lessons from the losers. After the Nurnberg executions, one of 
the few persons left alive, who had served on the Armed Forces High 
Command (the OKW), was General Walter Warlimont, who had 
been on that assignment six years and was General Jodl's deputy. 
In a document he prepared after the war he had this to say: 
"In any event, one fact has definitely been established 
by Germany's experience in World War II: Even though 
daring plans in the fields of strategy and operations, ex­
emplary military performances, and several other impond­
erables may offer favorable prospects to the weaker party 
during the course of hostilities, the entire war potential 
of a nation is in our time the decisive factor in a life-and­
death struggle among peoples. This potential is com­
posed of quantities which must be computed with math­
ematical precision. 
"The demands which Hitler's conduct of the war made 
upon the German people exceeded. the limits of their 
capabilities in every respect." 
Now, with 'national logistic strength assuming such a 
dominant role in our war potential, it becomes essential that we 
be able to harness this strength with a swiftness comparable to 
the speed of purely military mobilization. I realize that, with 
anything as complex as our industrial and economic system, this 
can never be easy or foolproof. Even so, it certainly seems obvious 
that we should work out a system of national mobilization now so 
that at least the system will be set up in plan form ready to be 
executed, not devised, when war comes. 
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Let's look for a moment at what happened in World War 
II. In the early thirties, plans were begun which were intended to
provide the formula for economic mobilization. There were sev­
eral revisions, but in 1940, a plan was on the books which was sup­
posed to be triggered by a mythical M-Day. This plan, as such,
was never used. Various reasons have been given; some say
that Roosevelt was reluctant to allow any person other than him­
self to assume the powers that would accrue to the administrator
of the plan, while others point out that because of the piecemeal
manner in which he became involved in the war, the M-Day which
was to trigger the plan never occurred.
In any event, what actually happened was the trial and 
error development of a scheme to effect the diversion to war of an 
industry which is traditionally governed by the law of supply and 
demand. Agency after agency was set up, and many of these were 
designed just to correct the shortcomings of their predecess'.:>rs. 
The resulting network of alphabetical agencies consisted in a large 
degree of collections of confused and ineffective transplanted dollar­
a-year men. I've picked out a number of these agencies and listed 
them here. Remember, though, that this is not all of them by any 
means. 
SP AB-Supply Priorities and Allocations Board 
OPM-Office of Production Management 
OP ACS-Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply 
OEC-Office of Export Control 
EDE-Economic Defense Board 
DDAR-Division of Defense Aid Reports 
OLLA-Office of Lend-Lease Administration 
OCD-Officer of Civilian Defense 
OFF-Office of Facts and Figures 
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These were some of the pre-Pearl Harbor agencies. And 
here are some of the better known ones that came later after 
pearl Harbor: 
WPB-War Production Board 
OP A-Office of Price Administration 
WMC-War Manpower Commission 
NWLB-National War Labor Board 
ODT-Office of Defense Transportation 
WSA-War Shipping Administration 
NRA-National Housing Agency 
I think this may be a good time to state our second lesson. 
WE MUST HAVE A PLAN FOR SWIFT NATIONAL 
MOBILIZATION, CONSISTENT WITH OUR ECONOMIC AND · 
POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
Notice, please, that I have used the words "consistent with our 
economic and political system". I feel that we must always keep in 
mind the delicate balance of the system under which we prefer to 
operate. There are so many economic forces involved in this system 
that any plan we use must take into account the possibility of 
creating dangerous local disruptions and hardships. 
But even more important is the problem of politics in a 
democracy. No one can predict the temper of a future Congress. 
And Congress is always reluctant to commit its successors to broad 
governmental blueprints. However, I personally feel that this prob­
lem of national mobilization must be met the same way that we meet 
the problem of military mobilization. And I think that industry 
wants it met that way. When I was a contracting officer in Wash­
ington a little over a year ago I had any number of business people 
come in and ask what their part in a mobilization would be. Other 
RESTRICTED 31 
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 4 [1951], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol4/iss2/1
RESTRICTED 
contracting officers had the same experience. And, remember, these 
firms were not looking for current business; they were plenty busy 
with current orders. They just wanted to know what their part in 
mobilization would be so that they could avoid the confusion of the 
last war. 
Now, I'm certainly not in any position to say whether we are 
slipping back into the piecemeal approach we had in the last war. I'm 
not sure any one is. But at least we do have the NSRB and the 
Munitions Board working away at the problem in two important 
areas. I think they are ahead of where we were in 1940, if only 
because of our World War II experience. Unfortunately, I'm 
afraid the perennial Washington Battle of Bailiwicks is taking its 
toll of speed and efficiency. 
You know, not too long ago a knowledge of logistics was not 
considered to be of any particular advantage to officers generally. 
In fact, the tendency was illustrated right here at the War College. 
In 1926, Captain R. R. Backenhus succeeded in setting up a logis­
tics section here, and started a system of committee projects in 
which naval campaigns were analyzed logistically. However, the 
succeeding head of the logistics section said that such matters as 
shoveling coal and combat loading didn't belong with the study of 
the principles of war, so they abolished the section and abandoned 
the study of logistics-for about twenty years. 
Unfortunately there has always been a natural tendency 
on the part of people who have to make plans to figure out some 
strategy and then assume that there would be enough logistic sup­
port. This worked all right when there was more support available 
than the military needed or could use. But as we all know, the size 
of the last war caused us to realize that somebody had to be planning 
the logistics as well as the strategy, because the logistics often got 
to be the limiting factor. Unfortunately, because it had never been 
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too important, there were almost no officers who fully understood 
the problems of logistics. That didn't make the problems any less 
real, and officers who were put in positions of logistic responsibil­
ity just had to learn the hard way. Because these positions were
gradually recognized as key billets, the services began to realize
that we must have high calibre officers who had more than a passing
knowledge of logistics.
Recently, I asked Admiral Carney for his idea of what points 
I should cover in this talk. He placed great emphasis on the fact 
that we started the war almost entirely tactical-minded and had to 
learn to be logistics-minded. And he said that as DCNO for Logis­
tics, he had had no more important project than the creation of an 
educational system in the Navy concerning logistics. 
I think this points up the third major lesson. 
WE HAVE RECOGNIZED LOGISTICS AS A MILITARY 
SCIENCE, AND, ADDITIONALLY, THE NECESSITY FOR 
THE TRAINING OF HIGH CALIBER OFFICERS IN 
LOGISTICS. 
I think this principle has been recognized now by all the 
services. Logistics courses are incorporated in the curricula of 
all of the service Colleges and, in addition, the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces devotes its whole course to the producer phase 
of logistics. Also, more top-rated officers are now occupying billets 
which are essentially logistic in nature-as for example, the G�4, 
Air Force Materiel, CNO Logistics, Munitions Board, and NSRB. 
In 1945, Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt was detailed to make a re­
port and recommendations in regard to the structure of the armed 
forces, This study was used in Congressional discussions on uni­
fication. One of the conclusions in the report reads in part like this: 
"It is believed that logistic planning of the scope re-
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quired by this last war must be recognized as a military 
science in itself, a sine qua non to success in strategy and 
tactics." 
Well, now I've talked about the part logistics plays in thi 
national picture, how industry must be tied in, and how logistics hai 
developed as a military science. This gets us down to the point oJ 
military planning-I use "military" to mean all of the armec 
forces-and, in particular, the relationship between strategic anc 
logistic planning. To get a better picture of this, I think we migh1 
look back to the early days of the war. 
The way the Japanese pulled their Pacific fait accompli in 
1941 put us just posterior to a large black logistics eight-ball. 
Everybody needed supplies and there weren't enough for anybody. 
As Admiral King said to the Secretary in 1942: "it was evident 
that no matter how much material of all types was produced in 
1942, it would not be enough." Naturally, each service felt justi­
fied in trying to procure as much for its own purposes as possible. 
The Eberstadt Report points out that if it had not been for the fat 
that existed in our economy at the time, this sort of willy-nilly pro­
curement could have led us to disaster. Now, in the meantime, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had held their first meeting in February 
of 1942, were beginning to fashion our over-all strategy. The 
strategic plans of the J. C. S. assigned tasks to the services and es­
tablished, in broad terms, the numbers and types of military units 
required. Then they got out strategic concept papers, preliminary 
campaign studies, and strategic deployment summaries. That's 
quite a bundle of papers. But those concept papers and cam­
paign studies were very general in nature and they weren't 
official, only informational-so they weren't much use in logistic 
planning. And the deployment summaries were at first pre­
pared by the individual services; based on availability of forces, not 
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requirements. In other words they would say: "Because we have 
100,000 men available, we will deploy them in X overseas theater.;'' 
This did not consider whether they could be supported in that 
theater. Well, you can see that this sort of procedure put logistic 
planning on a dangerously inexact basis. 
Now, after 1943, a lot of this difficulty was eliminated by 
the work of the Joint Logistic Committee-part of the J. C. S. or­
ganization. Admiral Badger told us about some of the things they 
did. Even so, as late as 1945, there was an interesting example of 
what not to do that illustrates what I am driving at. Now, these 
things happened in all the services and this is just an example that 
seemed to be appropriate. The Army Air Force decided to deploy 
certain types of planes in the Pacific, and scheduled production ac­
cordingly. But the joint logistic planners found that existing air­
fields in the Pacific, plus those in base development plans, could 
not accommodate the airplanes. The result was that planes and 
parts that could not be used had been produced at the expense of 
other needed items. 
The lesson I am trying to illustrate is this: 
CONCURRENT STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC PLAN­
NING IS ESSENTIAL, AND AS A COROLLARY-WE MUST 
HAVE LOGISTIC ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURES 
WHICH WILL MAKE POSSIBLE EFFECTIVE COORDINA­
TION OF OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC PLANNING. 
That's a mouthful; and probably you've heard it stated be­
fore. It may even sound elementary, but some things that seem ele­
mentary, after you know about them are not so obvious beforehand. 
For instance, although you wouldn't believe it, it is a fact that even 
under wartime conditions the Director of the Logistic Plans Division 
in CNO was not given access to the "Top-Secret" dispatch board of 
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the Commander-i:ri-Chief until late in 1943, two years after the war 
began. 
Today, as you know, the situation is considerably different. 
We now have well-established logistic organizations in the form of 
the Munitions Board, G-4, Air Materiel, and DCNO Logistics, and 
these are integrated into the military command structure. And we 
have officers in these positions who have earned the confidence and 
respect of their own and the other services. When strategic plans 
are made nowadays, they are made with the advice and concurrence 
of astute people whose primary duty is to keep a running estimate 
of our national logistic capability. 
Now I'd like to turn to a little different field: that of 
Atomic Energy. 
The power of the atomic bomb is well known to all of us. Now, 
not many people maintain that this weapon was responsible to a 
very large degree for the winning of the war. On the other hand, 
though, think what might have happened if the Axis had perfected 
this thing first ! 
We have all heard that there were some efforts made by 
Germany in the field of nuclear research. Their efforts however 
were nothing compared with our enormous projects, but there is 
sufficient evidence to show that the German scientists were on the 
right track. 
In 1942, the leading German physicists held a meeting at 
which possible military application of atomic energy was discussed. 
They invited the Nazi military leaders to attend this meeting. 
General Keitel's answer to that invitation said essentially this: 
"You will understand, of course, that I am too busy at the 
moment and therefore have to decline." In other words, a polite 
brushoff. And Himler wrote that unfortunately he would be out of 
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town the day of the meeting. Admiral Roeder also regretted. I think 
we owe a debt of gratitude to the myopic vision of German official­
dom in regard to this particular investigation. 
I think this serves as an illustration of our next major 
lesson. And I feel that it has strong logistic implications because 
it has to do with the means of waging war .. 
THE LESSON IS THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS CONTINUALLY INCREAS­
ING. 
The United States recognized this in the establishment of 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the last war. 
Of course, scientists are not generally military-minded, and at first 
there was a gap between the services and the scientists. But as offi­
cers learned how to use the laboratories and as scientists were 
sent right into the combat zones to learn what the problems were, 
this gap was broken down. This was a rather slow process, but 
fortunately in World War II we could afford the luxury of 
slowness. I don't think many people feel that we can afford this 
luxury in another major war. 
Now, you can't assign somebody to make a discovery, any 
more than the Patent Office could answer the veteran who wrote in 
and asked for a list of "all the uninvented inventions". No one can 
be sure where the next discovery will appear.. So you need to have 
a means of keeping in touch with science as a whole. And, also, of 
course, you have to set up projects in fields where there appears to 
be military application. 
When the Office of Scientific Research and Development was 
disestablished, the services began to set up their own formal or­
ganizations to foster research. The Navy, benefiting by the vision 
of Vice Admiral Harold Bowen, took the lead and, in 1946, set up 
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the Office of Naval Research. And, shortly afterward, as you know, 
the Research and Development Board, which operates at the J.C. S. 
level, began to take shape. 
Because of these organizations, plus other service offices 
now devoted to research, the military is becoming more closely as­
sociated with scientific research. With the Russians making the 
progress that they are, I think you'll agree that we can harq.ly af­
ford to forget this lesson. 
Now to change the subject again. Recently I was looking 
through a wartime list of Naval Bases overseas and noticed some 
very interesting facts. For instance, in 1944 we had apprqximately 
620 bases overseas, and note that this figure excludes any purely 
Army or Air bases. That's quite a few bases, and when you think 
how much even a small base costs in terms of material, manpower 
and the inescapable overhead, 620 bases represents a very substan-,., 
tial drain on our resources. Now, I'm not in any sense intending 
to convey the idea that these bases weren't useful. We all know 
that they were very useful. And in many cases they were the only 
thing that saved the day. 
But I came across some other very interesting facts in that 
list of Bases. There were 158 bases either disestablished or aband­
doned before VJ-Day. There were a good many others on which 
the date wasn't given, and probably at least part of these too were 
disestablished or moved before the end of the war. Now every 
time a base is moved or rolled up, it takes a lot of labor and a lot 
of shipping space to get it somewhere else., And of course it takes 
mjore labor to unload it and set it up in a new location. And it 
takes time, quite a bit of time. So when we talk about moving 
or rolling up one-fourth of all our bases, we are talking about an 
. . . 
operation of considerable size in itself. Of course, any bases we 
had to abandon are just that much material thrown away. 
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Maybe I'd better stop wandering and tell you what I'm lead­
ing up to. What I've just been saying was intended to give you 
an idea of what our tremendous network of bases cost us in the 
last war. I feel that a good part of the support that these bases 
rendered to the operating forces could have been given just as well 
by floating bases. Those of you who are familiar with Commodore 
Carter's Servon 10 or our own Admiral Beary's Logistic Support 
Force know what these outfits can do. The floating bases can 
service fleet units in port and the mobile support forces can keep 
the combat units right in the battle area for weeks at a time if 
necessary. I think we can draw a very important lesson from all 
this. 
WE MUST A VOID UNNECESSARY BASES AND CON­
STRUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE USE OF 
FLOATING SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING FORCES. 
I would like to point out again that I am not intending to· 
detract from the importance of keeping up our development of ad­
vance base techniques. For certain purposes they are irreplaceable. 
For instance, we can't very well build a floating airfield, even 
though some people would like to. And there are many other cases 
where you just can't use a floating base-as for example where 
there isn't sufficient harbor. But I believe that the idea of float­
ing support is something we can all think about with profit .. It's 
a coming thing. It's usually cheaper, it can move or disperse to 
avoid atomic attacks, and you can have it where you need it 
without having to bargain for shipping space. Admiral Low told 
me recently that Admiral Sherman is strongly behind this idea. So, 
you might say that, unlike so many things for which there is no 
other reason, it is policy too . 
. Well, that's six lessons. There are many more I could give, 
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but I will limit this discussion to one more. There are so many that 
seem deserving of mention. For instance, there is the problem of 
packaging and marking (a lesson I'm not sure we learned) ; there is 
air transportation; there are the new engineering techniques like 
the artificial harbors and floating docks. These are all important 
lessons. And there is another one that I think we might bring up 
as a particular subject for further study. That is the question of 
shipping control. We learned something about land traffic control 
in the first World War, but the more extensive second war forced 
us to do something about getting the most out of our ocean·shipping. 
This is a parti:::ularly difficult problem to solve. 
But there was one lesson that had its roots right in the 
firing line and yet had implications clear up to the national level. 
I'll have to explain this a little bit with some examples. 
In planning an individual operation, one of the things the 
commander has to figure out is his requirements for all of the 
items to be used in the operation. He does this essentially by mul­
tiplying the forces involved by various usage factors and then 
multiplying the result by his own judgment factor. If he has 
good usage data and knows the conditions under which it was 
gathered, he will rely on it. Then his judgment factor adds in his 
own knowledge of this particular operation. But if he doesn't un­
derstand the usage data, or doesn't trust it, then he is forced to 
make his judgment factor more of a wild guess or a maybe pious 
hope. The equation: (Forces x Usage Factors) J. F., = Require­
ments is perhaps oversimplified, but generally speaking, the re­
quirements equal the forces times the usage factor, times the 
judgment factor; and if the usage factor is good, the result can be 
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The commander's J factor becomes another question mark and the 
result is often fairly horrible. Most of you can. probably remem­
ber seeing somewhere in your travels the visible results of this sort 
of situation in the form of huge piles of rusting or rotting equip­
ment. 
I think we can draw another significant lesson from this. 
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COLLECT AND TABU­
LATE GOOD USAGE DATA THAT INCORPORATES THE 
OPERATING EXPERIENCE UNDER WHICH IT IS AC­
CUMULATED. 
Now what I've said was intended to show how this busines 
of usage data can affect individual operations. But it has much 
more important implications. For instance, think of the part that 
it plays in determining storage levels at points along the pipe line 
to the front. Storage space is almost always at a premium in war­
time. And at even more of a premium is transportation. If we 
have to store or ship too much of one thing it means sacrificing 
something else that actually may be needed worse. 
Finally, this problem extends up to the Munitions Board, and 
the NSRB, and even back to industry itself. Lately, you know, 
there have been some remarkable development in the field of rapid 
electronic computation, and there have been efforts to apply these 
computers to the logistic field, on a national level. The trouble 
always is that if you don't know what to put in one of these gadgets, 
you are up against the quickest means of making mistakes yet 
devised. 
Looking at the national picture, this usage data really gets 
to be a problem. You know, quite a few logisticians have made a 
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name for themselves by ·always having inore on hand than wa$' 
needed. This may get good fitness reports, but I submit that with 
every resource of the nation strained as it would be� too many out.:. 
standing logisticians of this variety might well lose our next war for 
us. We have to know what we need, so that we are able to make 
enough of everything. I don't think we can afford to make too many 
gross errors in production as we had last time. 
Just as a final example of what I mean-in the last war we 
manufactured 21 million tons of ammunition. Half of that got over­
seas. Four million tons, orJess than a fourth of it was shot at the 
enemy. Now, I certainly don't advocate trying to shoot the last man 
with the last bullet, but 17 million tons extra does seem to be. a 
little too much. 
Now, as a summary, I would like to restate these seven 
lessons in condensed form. 
1. NATIONAL LOGISTIC STRENGTH HAS A CON­
TROLLING IMPORTANCE AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN NATION­
AL WAR POTENTIAL. 
2. WE MUST HAVE A PLAN FOR SWIFT NATIONAL
MOBILIZATION, CONSISTENT WITH QUR ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
3. WE HA VE RECOGNIZED LOGISTICS AS A MILI­
TARY SCIENCE. 
4. CONCURRENT STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC PLAN­
NING IS ESSENTIAL. 
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6. WE MUST AVOID UNNECESSARY BASES AND
CONSTRUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH THE USE OF 
FLOATING SUPPORT. 
7. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COLLECT AND TABU­
LATE GOOD USAGE DATA THAT INCORPORATES THE OP­
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